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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDALYN ENCE, nka 
WENDALYN SMITH : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY D. ENCE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
: Case No. 950829-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Comes now the appellant to the above-captioned matter 
(hereinafter "wife"), by and through counsel, and submits the 
following as her Reply Brief of Appellant herein: 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FACTORS IMPORTANT IN FIXING AN ALIMONY AWARD 
CANNOT BE INHERENTLY FOUND IN THE TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE 
The Jones factors cannot be inherently found in the Findings 
of Fact; rather, they must be explicit. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985). Mr. Ence, (hereinafter "husband") acknowledges 
that the trial court did not specifically categorize its findings 
as Jones factors but they were sufficiently detailed and 
comprehensive to support the award of alimony. However, the 
findings quoted by husband only state facts as to the parties' 
ages, gross income, net income and duration of marriage. 
(Appellee's Brief, at 14/ Findings of Fact #13, R. at 101 - 102). 
This is not the specific information needed to allow the court to 
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analyze the required Jones factors in setting alimony. Marshall 
v. Marshall. 288 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah App. 1996) . 
Husband argues that inherent within the testimony lies his 
need for alimony. The Jones factors cannot be found inherent in 
the testimony or evidence. Rather, the facts and reasons for the 
court's decision must be set forth fully and be adequate enough 
to show that the trial court's discretionary determination was 
rationally based. Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah App. 
1992). In Roberts, the trial court made findings on the parties' 
gross income in relation to its child support calculation. The 
Court of Appeals held that gross income was not enough, there 
must be adequate findings on the parties' needs, and a comparison 
of their relative abilities to provide support. Roberts v. 
Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198. 
Likewise, in Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 
1993), the trial court's findings on income alone were 
insufficient to ensure that it used its discretion rationally 
based on the three Jones factors. Even though the trial court 
found that Mrs. Godfrey was a well and able bodied person, 
earning $23,000 per year and Mr. Godfrey was earning $45,000 per 
year with restricted income ability, these findings were found 
insufficient by the Court of Appeals. Godfrey v. Godfrey. 854 
P.2d at 589. 
In the present case, the court based its alimony award on a 
reasonable standard of living for husband even though the court 
had no evidence of husband's needs. Thus, the court was unable 
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to say how it arrived at the alimony award or even what 
relationship the award had to husband's needs. If the court 
considered facts in the record bearing on the Jones factors, as 
husband has asserted, it failed to enumerate what those facts 
were and how they were applied to the Jones factors. Thus, 
summarization of the evidence in counsel's closing statement does 
not take the place of the court's own analysis. (Appellee's 
brief at 18). 
Husband argues that the trial court based the alimony award 
on the parties' specific situation as presented in the record. 
However, the parties' specific situation warrants an alimony 
analysis under 30-3-5(7)(e) (Supp. 1996). Thus, the trial court 
failed to determine what relationship the alimony award had to 
husband's actual contribution to wife's enhanced earning power, 
if any. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1991). 
As to husband's contributions, he states in his brief that 
the parties' savings were used to assist wife in pursuing her 
education. There is nothing in the testimony or exhibits 
indicating that any of the parties' savings were used to assist 
in wife's education. The facts, instead, show the contrary: 
while wife was attending school, husband managed to maintain his 
retirement accounts and the parties saved enough to purchase a 
home in Tucson with a $10,000 down payment. (R. at 253; Tr. at 
130) . 
Husband argues that his income and earning ability has 
decreased as a result of supporting wife in her pursuit of her 
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education, or that his income is static at best. Nowhere in the 
testimony or exhibits is there evidence of these allegations. 
Although husband alluded to the instability of employment in the 
construction industry in his testimony, there is simply no way of 
knowing what husband's employment situation would have been if he 
stayed in Arizona instead of moving to Utah or if wife had not 
pursued her education. Husband's argument is speculative at 
best. Furthermore, husband states in his brief that he was faced 
with non-union jobs in Utah. However, husband actually testified 
at trial that the construction jobs in Utah were "rare union 
jobs." (R. at 272; Tr. at 149). 
Husband contends that the alimony awarded to him is based 
upon the partnership theory of marriage and that the trial 
court's findings relate that theory specifically to the facts of 
this case. However, husband does not explain the partnership 
theory of marriage and fails to notice that Martinez specifically 
rejected a commercial partnership theory of marriage as being 
unjust as it could deny a spouse any award of support or 
property, irrespective of need and the other person's ability to 
pay. Martinez, 818 P.2d at 541. 
Husband argues that his is clearly a case in which his 
efforts and sacrifices helped to relieve wife's burden of 
supporting herse]f and the children and allowed wife to devote 
most of her time and attention to her education. However, it is 
interesting to note that in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d at 76, 
n.8, the Appellate Court when considering the wife's contribution 
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to husband's education, discussed whether Dr. Martinez would or 
could have entered and completed medical school had his wife 
obtained a divorce earlier. The court implies that Dr. Martinez 
would probably not have been able to attend medical school 
because of child support and alimony payments he would have been 
required to pay. This discussion helps to show Mrs. Martinez's 
contribution to her husband's education. The present case is the 
opposite of the Martinez situation because it is apparent that 
wife would have and could have attended medical school if she 
divorced earlier. Since she was home with the children, she 
would have had custody and been awarded child support. Since she 
would have been in need of assistance, she would have received 
alimony. And, she would have been able to obtain the same 
student loans to pay for her tuition and school expenses. This 
shows that husband's contributions of support were not more than 
his legal obligation. 
II. THERE IS NO ENTITLEMENT TO LONG TERM 
ALIMONY IN UTAH 
Husband's discussion of cases where the courts have 
overturned awards of temporary alimony and awarded permanent 
alimony misses the issue altogether. (Appellee's brief, pg. 20 
through 24). Husband overlooks the fact that the spouses in 
these cases had minimum work experience or medical problems and 
were unable to provide sufficient income for themselves. These 
are not the circumstances in the present case. Both parties here 
are equally self supporting and employable. Neither party needs 
the support of the other to develop an employable skill or to 
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maintain a particular standard of living. 
Husband argues that the cases cited by wife showing the 
evolution of case law in Utah on the issue of alimony may be seen 
to stand for the proposition that when the marriage is of long 
duration, in which both parties sacrificed and worked toward the 
common good of the family, the spouse with the smaller earning 
potential should be entitled to long term (if not permanent) 
alimony. (Appellee's Brief at 20). Nowhere do these cases even 
suggest that proposition, let alone specify it. Instead, these 
cases show that the wife spent most of her life providing 
services to her family with no monetary reimbursement, had either 
minimum work experience or none at all and is in her late forties 
or fifties at the time of divorce. These women are unable to 
enter the job market and support themselves anywhere near 
resembling the style in which the couple had been living. Rather 
than awarding them alimony because they are entitled to it, the 
court awarded support because of their needs, seeking to mitigate 
the economic harm that divorce had on them. 
Thus, spouses with a smaller earning potential do not 
automatically receive permanent alimony or long term alimony 
without an analysis of the Jones factors. Further, husband has 
overlooked the fact that the trial court in the present case did 
award long term alimony to husband and the maximum amount under 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5-7(h) (Supp. 1996). 
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III. IT WOULD BE EQUITABLE TO USE GUIDELINES WHEN 
AWARDING COMPENSATION ADJUSTMENTS 
Husband argues that the Utah courts and Utah Legislature 
have refrained from requiring strict guidelines in alimony awards 
and marital property distributions, relying instead on equitable 
principles. In divorce actions, equitable principles are 
required pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 
1996). Other than the factors enumerated in Jones, there are no 
additional guidelines to aid a court in considering and in 
awarding compensation pursuant to § 30-3-5(7) (e) (Supp. 1996), 
which only requires a court to "consider" a major change of 
income due to the collective efforts of both spouses. There is 
no requirement that the court actually compensate a spouse. The 
court in Martinez only states that in making a compensating 
adjustment, the award must have some relationship to the 
receiving spouse's actual contribution to the enhanced earning 
power or to that spouse's needs. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 at 
541. (Emphasis added). 
If the trial court in the present case was making a 
compensation adjustment in its award of alimony, it failed to 
show what relationship the amount of the award had to wife's 
enhanced earning power as well as husband's needs. A more 
equitable award would result if guidelines were established to 
show the relationship of the amount of the award to actual 
specific contributions of support. For instance, the court could 
award the supporting spouse one-half of his or her earnings for 
the period in which he or she supported the student spouse while 
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in school, plus any school related direct costs such as tuition 
and books. For non-monetary contributions, the court could set 
some limits as to the amount of the award. Strict guidelines 
would not be needed, but an award would be equitable because 
actual contributions would be reimbursed and actual sacrifices 
recognized. 
The purpose of alimony, however, is not reimbursement and 
the Supreme Court in Martinez makes that clear by striking down 
"equitable restitution" in favor of equitable provisions under 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1). As to reimbursement, the 
Martinez court is not in favor, stating: 
The efforts each spouse makes for the other 
and for their common marital interests cannot 
be quantified in monetary terms, their 
respective contributions netted out, and a 
balance struck at the termination of a 
marriage. The very idea of marriage 
contemplates mutual effort and mutual 
sacrifice. . . . the spouse's contributions 
cannot be reduced to a common denominator 
that allows for a valid comparison in 
monetary terms. Martinez, 818 at 540 - 541. 
Because alimony is intended to be based on actual need and 
ability to pay with the purpose to provide one spouse with 
sufficient income to obtain the necessities of life, it is 
clearly not equitable to award one spouse an excessive amount of 
alimony for a long period of time without any consideration of 
that spouse's actual need and standard of living. Both spouses 
in a marriage have an equal duty to support their families and, 
if one spouse is a student and not contributing support, that 
alone should not result in a future claim by the other spouse for 
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unpaid past support. 
IV. AN EQUALIZATION OF INCOME APPROACH SHOULD 
NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE 
Utah Code Annotated, § 30-3-5(7) (d) (Supp. 1996), states 
"The Court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living." 
Husband relies on Martinez in support of his claim that the 
trial court erred in failing to equalize the parties' respective 
income levels. Husband states that the fact situation in this 
present case is precisely the type of situation described in 
Martinez, so equalization of income in this case is proper. 
However, husband fails to show how the facts in the Martinez case 
compares with the present one, where Mrs. Martinez had only 
worked outside the home for a very short time and had limited job 
skills. Moreover, Martinez does not employ an equalization of 
living standards approach. Dr. Martinez was earning $120,000 per 
year at the time of divorce and the court of Appeals awarded Mrs. 
Martinez $750 per month permanent alimony, which is hardly close 
to equalizing income. Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 75 
(Utah App. 1988) . This amount of alimony was not overturned by 
the Supreme Court in Martinez 818 P.2d at 543. Martinez holds 
only that in some circumstances it may be appropriate to try to 
equalize the spouses' respective standards of living. Martinez, 
818 P.2d at 542. 
The circumstances which make it appropriate to equalize 
income are in cases where the recipient spouse had either become 
or always was severally economically disadvantaged as a result of 
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having not worked either at all or substantially, outside of the 
home during the marriage. Wife has thoroughly discussed the 
equalization of living standard of approach in her brief and it 
is not necessary to repeat it. (Brief of Appellant, at 23 
through 26). 
It would be an impossible task to attempt to equalize the 
income in the present case, or in any case where there is an end 
of the marriage drastic income change for one of the parties due 
to an enhanced earning ability acquired during the marriage. Any 
attempt to do so would be inherently unfair, ignoring principles 
of equity established throughout years of case law. Not only 
would the court be forced to speculate as to what the standard of 
living would be, it would have to use the equalization of 
standard of living approach to reward a spouse for sacrifices or 
contributions of support while the other one acquired an advanced 
degree. This is not allowed by the Supreme Court in Martinez. 
In this case, husband seeks to benefit from wife's medical 
degree by mistakenly claiming that her recent change in earnings 
entitles him to alimony based upon a standard of living which he 
never had and which would give him an income to which he had 
never grown accustomed. Husband claims that his standard of 
living is the standard of living that he might have enjoyed if 
the parties had not divorced. Since it is impossible for the 
court to determine how the parties standard of living might have 
been, as there is no way of knowing how they may have spent their 
income, any standard of living determination on that basis would 
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be highly speculative. 
V. THERE SHOULD BE NO AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IN THIS ACTION 
Husband argues that he should be reimbursed for attorney's 
fees incurred in this action because he is in need of financial 
assistance and the requested fees were reasonable. The trial 
court awarded husband attorney's fees of $1,000 although he asked 
for $3,000. Wife has paid the .$1,000 in attorney's fees as 
ordered by the court and husband has accepted this sum. Wife has 
not appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees. 
The trial court has authority to award attorney's fees in a 
divorce action pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-3 (1995). Bell v. Bell, 
810 P.2d 489 (Utah App, 1991) specifically outlines the factors 
that need to be presented by way of evidence before an award of 
attorney's fees can occur, i.e. (1) the financial need of the 
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the other spouse to pay; (3) 
the reasonableness of the requested fees. The failure to 
consider any of the enumerated factors is ground for reversal on 
the fee issue. Marshall v. Marshall, 288 Utah Adv. at 9. 
Furthermore, it is an abuse of discretion to award less attorney 
fees than that requested. Bell, 810 at 494. In Bell, the issue 
on appeal was whether or not the court could reduce the amount of 
fees that were being requested without some specific finding and 
remanded that issue for that reason. IcL 
In the present case, the trial court entered the following 
Finding of Fact regarding attorney fees: 
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The court finds that the defendant's 
attorney, Mary C. Corporon, has charged a fee 
in this matter of $150 per hour, which the 
court finds to be a reasonable fee for an 
attorney of her experience practicing in this 
community in the field of contested domestic 
relations law. The court finds that it is 
reasonable, just and proper that the 
plaintiff should pay a portion of defendant's 
attorney fees in the sum of $1,000, and that 
the defendant should pay the remaining 
balance of his attorney fees. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law #15. 
In its ruling the court found the rate charged for 
attorney's fees was reasonable, and stated the following: 
The court believes after I have done some 
adjustments, after the alimony award, that it 
would be appropriate for the plaintiff to pay 
$1,000 towards defendant's attorney's fees. 
And that plaintiff should be responsible for 
her own attorney's fees. (Tr. at 59). 
It could be inferred from this statement that the court 
awarded less attorney's fees than husband requested because of 
the large amount of alimony awarded, but it is not clear if this 
was the court's intent. What is clear, however, is that there is 
a paucity of evidence showing husband's need for the requested 
fees. 
While there is evidence of husband's income at trial, there 
is no evidence of his monthly living expenses which is required 
to prove need. Husband testified as to his monthly rent for his 
trailer home ($500), and he was ordered to pay one-half of the 
monthly mortgage payments on the parties' Tucson home until it 
was sold (approximately $350 for husband's share), but this 
evidence is ineffective to portray regular monthly needs. 
Even though the trial court concludes that husband's 
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attorney's fees were "appropriate," this is not the standard and 
there is no finding regarding his need for such an award. 
Furthermore, the record is clear that no evidence was presented 
as to his need for the court to consider. As a result, the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are insufficient to allow 
a meaningful review of the trial court's ruling. Wife has paid 
attorney fees to husband in full. This court should affirm the 
award of attorney's fees and award no fees on appeal based on 
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the evidence nor husband's own testimony show his 
need for alimony. The trial court failed to analyze the Jones 
factors in making the alimony award but attempted instead to base 
the award on a reasonable standard of living for husband without 
a detailed analysis showing how it arrived at the amount and 
duration. 
This court should determine that an equalization of income 
approach is not appropriate or possible in this case because it 
would be unfair and highly speculative. Because wife's increased 
earnings occurred at the end of the marriage, the fact situation 
in this case calls for an alimony analysis under Utah Code 
Annotated § 30-3-5(7) (e) (Supp. 1996). Such an analysis would 
determine whether wife's enhanced earning potential is due to the 
collective efforts of both parties. 
This court should establish general guidelines which a trial 
court can use if it finds a compensation adjustment is 
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appropriate. If this court awards compensation to husband, it 
should determine what efforts husband has made to wife's 
education and compensate husband with an amount which directly 
relates to his support during the time wife was going to school. 
This court should affirm the award of attorney's fees and 
award no fees on appeal. Husband has shown no need for such fees 
as required. 
Therefore, appellant respectfully requests that this court 
analyze the issue of alimony under the appropriate statute after 
a consideration of the Jones factors and substitute its own 
judgment for that of the trial court. Further, this court should 
affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees and determine 
that there should be no attorney's fees awarded on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1996. 
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^oCifcc^^ 
CAROLYN D7 
Attorney for 
Wendalyn Smith 
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